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The Effect of Credit Derivatives on 
Financial Stability
Due to the recent financial turmoil, questions have been raised about the impact of 
complex financial products, like credit derivatives, on financial stability. The academic 
literature however does not provide a clear answer to this question. This paper empirically 
links the stability of the financial sector to the use of credit derivatives for the main constituents 
of the European financial sector. We find that the use of credit derivatives increases the 
probability of default and thus reduces the overall financial sector stability. In addition, 
we find evidence that this relationship is progressive and economically meaningful. 
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1. Introduction
The debate regarding the impact of financial derivatives 
on financial sector stability is a long-standing one, but 
became more relevant as a result of the global financial 
crisis. There is no unambiguous answer to this question in the 
literature. The IMF Global Financial Stability Report explains 
that the increase in credit transfers has helped to make 
the banking and overall financial system more resilient 
and increases financial stability. With a broader and more 
diverse investor base, credit markets may deepen and 
liquidity should improve. At the same time, the transition 
from bank-dominated to a more market-based financial 
system presents new challenges and vulnerabilities. 
Rule (2001) explains that the development of the credit 
derivative market has clear potential benefits for financial 
stability. Credit derivatives allow the origination and 
funding of credit to be separated from the allocation of the 
resulting credit risk. A more efficient allocation of credit risk 
allows banks to expand granting loans and taking deposits, 
which enhances portfolio diversification even more and 
reinforces risk reducing effects of credit risk transfer. 
Rule (2001) also acknowledges, however, that credit 
risk transfer markets present some challenges and may 
carry potential costs. Separating the exposure to credit risk 
from the direct relationship with the borrower might lessen 
capacity to monitor creditworthiness. Sellers of protection 
in a CDS contract have no contractual rights, thus reducing 
their ability to influence the decision making of the 
reference company. It might also make it more difficult for 
creditors, regulators and the monetary authorities to assess 
the actual credit exposures of banks and of the banking 
system as a whole. Although credit derivatives are in Rules’ 
(2001) view more likely to disperse credit risk, there is also 
the possibility that they could deliberately or inadvertently 
concentrate it. 
In the recent years regulators have been largely 
welcoming the development of credit derivatives, not only 
because of the more efficient allocation of credit risk or 
diversification effects but also because credit derivatives 
increase the relative liquidity of loans. In the past, illiquidity of 
bank loans has been a main source of banking fragility. An 
improved ability to sell assets will make banks less vulnerable 
to liquidity shocks. Instefjord (2003) states, however, that this 
ignores that banks may change their behaviour as a result 
of the increased liquidity of their assets. They may take on 
new risks following a reduction in the risks on their balance 
sheet through credit risk transfer.
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Instefjod (2003) notes that banks that have access to a 
richer set of derivatives to manage risk, will also play the 
risk acquisition game more aggressively. Risk exposures 
become more attractive, knowing that they can be 
offloaded through a more active derivatives trading 
policy. These views are consistent with the empirical work 
of Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004), who provide evidence 
that banks who manage their risks in a loan sale market 
hold a larger share of their portfolio in risky assets than banks 
inactive in loan sale. 
The question that naturally arises is how much of the 
extra risk will be transferred to outside parties and how 
much remains within the bank. Instefjod (2001) claims this is 
conditional on the price of credit and the price elasticity of 
the underlying credit markets. If too elastic, banks operate 
too aggressively in the underlying credit markets following 
a derivatives innovation which threaten bank stability. If too 
inelastic there is an opposite effect and the banking sector 
is stabilized by the development of the credit derivatives 
market. 
Clearly, the literature shows no conclusive answer to the 
question whether credit derivatives raise or lower financial 
stability. Some authors believe that the introduction of 
credit derivatives increases the stability, while others 
claim that banks will change their behaviour now that 
they have access to credit derivatives. In the current 
study, we empirically investigate the relation between 
credit derivatives and financial stability, measured by the 
probability of default of the 20 largest European financial 
institutions. We find a negative relationship between the 
financial stability and the increased use of credit derivatives. 
Also, credit rating agency Standard & Poor’s is found to 
incorporate CDS positively, but insignificant. In addition, 
we find evidence that this relationship is progressive and 
economically meaningful.
2. Methodology and data 
characteristics
We will use three different methods of calculating the 
probability of default: bond spread, CDS spread, and 
Merton (1974) distance to default model. In addition, we will 
use the credit rating of Standard and Poor (S&P) to see to 
what extent they incorporate the use of CDS. In the model, 
we use the probabilities of default as dependent variable 
and the amounts outstanding on credit derivatives as 
independent variables. We use Altman’s (1968) bankruptcy 
prediction model as a source for control variables: working 
capital to total asset, the retained earnings to total asset, 
pre-tax income (earnings before tax) to total assets, the 
market value of equity to book value of total debt, and 
the sales to total asset. Greatrex (2008) finds that market 
data, like implied volatility, can explain deviations in credit 
spreads. We therefore add the implied volatility of the stock 
prices into the model as a sixth control variable. The seventh 
explanatory variable is the variable of interest, the amount 
outstanding on credit derivative contracts to total assets. 
Our sample consists of 20 main players in the European 
financial sector. We obtain the 20 largest banks in Europe, 
measured by total assets, using Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope. 
In this sample, we include only publicly traded banks. Even 
though the sample consists of only 20 banks, because of 
the relative size it provides a fair coverage of the European 
banking sector. Moreover, the largest banks are obviously 
of particular interest due to their relatively large impact in 
the stability, and the fact that they make up the majority 
of the credit derivative market. Table 1 lists the sample of 
financial institutions. 
Table 1: Sample banks
Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group Plc
UniCredit SpA
Barclays Plc Banco Santander SA
Deutsche Bank AG Fortis
BNP Paribas Credit Suisse
HSBC Holdings Plc HBOS Plc
Crédit Agricole SA Dexia
UBS AG Commerzbank AG
ING Groep NV Lloyds Banking Group Plc
Société Générale Danske Bank Group
ABN Amro Holding NV Nordea Bank AB
24 APPLIED FINANCE LETTERS | Volume 01 - ISSUE 01 | 2012
The outstanding amount of credit derivatives will be 
obtained by examining the annual reports of each of these 
financial institutions. We use data from 2001-2008. Since the 
market for credit derivatives before 2001 was small, only a 
limited number of financial institutions released information 
about their holdings. After the implementation of IFRS in 
2004, almost all banks provide sufficient information on their 
derivative positions. The market based information that is 
used in this study is gathered using Thomson One Banker, 
Reuters, and Datastream. We use the CDS premium on 
senior secured debt; for bonds we use the variable rate 
over the swap curve.1
The probability of default as calculated with bond 
spreads shows a pattern that is comparable with that of 
the overall economy. The probability of default increases 
during economic downturns (2001 – 2002 and 2007 – 2008), 
and decreases in prosperous times. Especially during the 
recent financial crisis the probabilities of default increased 
drastically. At the end of 2008 several banks had a 
probability of default of over 12% (HBOS and Nordea) while 
others remained around 2% (Santander). 
There is no CDS spread data available for 2001; for 2002 
this data is only available for two companies (ING and 
Nordea). Especially during the years 2003 – 2006 the CDS 
spread is extremely low and so is the default probability. 
Only in 2007 and 2008 the probability of default increases. 
In 2008 however the average probability of default using 
CDS spreads is 2.7%, which is remarkably lower than that of 
the bond spread. The highest default probability is that of 
Dexia with 6.7%. Both methods use market data so that one 
would expect the results to be more or less comparable. 
The probability of default from the Merton model shows 
the most extreme results. During the economic downturn 
of 2001 the probabilities of default are considerably higher 
than those during the next years. However, starting in 2007 
and maturing in 2008, the Merton DD model provides its 
extreme results when comparing with the previous two 
methods. In 2008 the average probability of default was 
10.6% while Fortis had a 36.3% probability to default on its 
obligations. 
The probability of default using S&P’s credit rating shows 
the smoothest pattern. Only small adjustments in the 
credit rating are made by S&P. A few companies have 
the same rating throughout the entire sample and most 
other companies have only one adjustment during these 
eight years. Even in 2008 the average probability of default 
is 0.055% and the maximum 0.08% which is rather low 
considering the problems in the financial sector.
 
Figure 1a: Average probability of default using bond 
spreads
Figure 1b: Average probability of default using CDS 
spreads
 
Figure 1c: Average probability of default using Merton 
DD model
Figure 1d: Average probability of default using 
Standard and Poor’s credit rating
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Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of both the probabilities of default (a) and the control variables (b). A 
noticeable thing is the relatively high standard deviation of X7, which is the credit derivative variable. The mean is much 
higher than the median, indicating that a small number of banks uses a large amount of credit derivatives. 
 
Table 2a: Descriptive statistics of the probabilities of default
 Bond spread CDS spread Merton DD S&P
 Mean 0.02537 0.00600 0.05861 0.00048
 Median 0.01755 0.00121 0.00192 0.00047
 Maximum 0.12811 0.06735 0.48875 0.00133
 Minimum 0.00262 0.00013 0.00000 0.00020
 Std. Dev. 0.02433 0.01071 0.10972 0.00022
 Skewness 1.82 2.91 2.23 1.92
 Kurtosis 6.75 13.10 7.55 8.12
 Observations 160 115 156 156
Notes: Table displays the descriptive statistics of our three measures of default, plus the credit rating.
 
Table 2a: Descriptive statistics of the probabilities of default
 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7
 Mean 0.03690 0.01763 0.00607 0.05982 0.06145 0.31301 0.45446
 Median 0.03138 0.01699 0.00696 0.05551 0.05483 0.22236 0.18153
 Maximum 0.16162 0.04395 0.01725 0.18487 0.17425 1.00193 2.81736
 Minimum 0.00648 -0.01126 -0.02321 0.00629 0.00189 0.11205 0.00000
 Std. Dev. 0.01841 0.00997 0.00574 0.03084 0.02779 0.20255 0.67281
 Skewness 2.90 -0.22 -2.14 0.75 1.34 1.42 2.02
 Kurtosis 18.20 3.73 9.94 4.05 5.19 4.20 6.36
 Observations 126 155 158 157 157 132 130
Notes: X1 = working capital to total assets; X2 = retained earnings to total asset; X3 = pre-tax income to total asset;  
X4 = market value of equity to book value of total debt; X5 = sales to total asset; X6 = implied volatility using at-the-
money options; X7 = notional amount of credit derivative contracts to total assets.
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Table 3 shows the correlations between the probabilities 
of default and the explanatory variables. Between the 
probabilities, the correlation is the highest between the CDS 
spreads and Merton DD with 78%. The correlation between 
the bond spreads and CDS spreads is 67%. The correlation 
of the default probabilities with X7, the notional amount of 
credit derivatives to total assets, provides a first answer to 
our research question. For the bond spread, CDS spread, 
and Merton DD model, the correlation is highly comparable 
and positive. This indicates that the probability of default 
increases with an increased use of credit derivatives. 
The credit rating, on the other hand, depicts a negative 
correlation. As such, S&P views the use of credit derivatives 
as increasing the creditworthiness of a financial institution.
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix of the probabilities of default and the variables
 Bond spread
CDS 
spread
Merton 
DD S&P X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7
Bond 
spread  
CDS 
spread 0.67302  
Merton 
DD 0.70205 0.77675  
S&P 0.09530 0.21300 0.06511  
X1 -0.21041 -0.20864 -0.19280 0.01052  
X2 -0.33039 -0.26846 -0.22941 -0.14501 0.29261  
X3 -0.69611 -0.69254 -0.61629 -0.33067 0.49749 0.41794  
X4 -0.52361 -0.55462 -0.60109 -0.25363 0.63972 0.31786 0.72644  
X5 -0.01837 0.10420 -0.14118 -0.11069 -0.02780 -0.38205 0.10512 0.02730  
X6 0.79103 0.87358 0.86052 0.14154 -0.21524 -0.22834 -0.73496 -0.64466 -0.05313  
X7 0.26390 0.25212 0.28177 -0.10191 -0.38802 0.13979 -0.33986 -0.37703 -0.27246 0.27602  
Notes: X1 = working capital to total assets; X2 = retained earnings to total asset; X3 = pre-tax income to total asset;  
X4 = market value of equity to book value of total debt; X5 = sales to total asset; X6 = implied volatility using at-the-
money options; X7 = notional amount of credit derivative contracts to total assets.
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Table 4: Regression using Bond spreads, CDS spreads, Merton DD and Standard & Poor
Variable Bond Spread CDS Spread Merton DD S&P
C 22.583*** (0.211)
3.456*** 
(0.218)
5.477*** 
(0.712)
3.295*** 
(0.060)
X1 0.690 (26.085)
-2.420 
(3.984)
-13.054 
(25.813)
-0.281 
(1.224)
X2 -33.413 (49.584)
-2.693 
(6.929)
-6.718 
(26.722)
2.459 
(2.499)
X3 125.341 (111.507)
-9.631 
(12.222)
11.421 
(48.464)
8.907** 
(3.806)
X4 10.484 (12.438)
6.448*** 
(2.234)
-0.112 
(14.369)
-0.688 
(0.644)
X5 25.044* (14.539)
-2.978*** 
(0.955)
5.492* 
(3.108)
-0.272 
(0.448)
X6 -0.937*** (0.145)
-1.835*** 
(0.299)
-6.429*** 
(1.461)
0.002 
(0.059)
X7 -0.061* (0.038)
-0.104*** 
(0.036)
-0.145 
(0.142)
0.011 
(0.521)
 
Adjusted R2 0.6633 0.831 0.613 0.781
AIC 0.0696 -0.0330 3.1218 -2.4891
Observations 93 79 89 93
Notes: X1 = working capital to total assets; X2 = retained earnings to total asset; X3 = pre-tax income to total asset;  
X4 = market value of equity to book value of total debt; X5 = sales to total asset; X6 = implied volatility using at-the-
money options; X7 = notional amount of credit derivative contracts to total assets. The numbers in parenthesis are 
standard errors; *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
3. Empirical results
The estimation results are presented in Table 4. In this 
regression the Z-score of the probability of default is the 
dependent variable2. 
Overall, we observe in Table 4 that the use of credit 
derivatives is detrimental to the stability of the financial 
institutions. This relation is significant in two cases. The 
probability of default given by the credit rating agency 
S&P actually decreases with the use of CDS, although not 
significantly.
Using the bond spreads, sales to total assets, implied 
volatility, and our variable of interest credit derivatives to 
total sales, are significant. In increase in sales to total assets 
decreases the probability of default. An increase in implied 
volatility increases the probability of default. The coefficient 
for X7 is negative, so that an increase in credit derivative 
positions increases default risk and thus decrease stability. 
When focusing on the CDS spreads, there are four 
significant variables: market value to total debt, sales 
to total assets, implied volatility, and credit derivatives 
to total assets. The sign of the coefficient for the sales to 
total assets is minus, though, which implies that a rise in this 
ratio increases risk, which is in contradiction with the result 
from the model using bond spreads. The credit derivative 
coefficient is again negative. 
For the Merton model, only two variables are significant: 
sales to total assets and the implied volatility. The signs of 
these variables are consistent with those from the model 
using bond spreads. The coefficient of the implied volatility, 
however, is much higher than with the other models.  
In this model using the S&P rating, only pre-tax income 
to total assets is significant; all other variables have high 
p-values. The credit derivative variable has a positive sign, 
in contrast to the previous models3.
To determine the economic impact of the credit derivative 
variable on the probability of default, we use our estimated 
models and calculate the probability of default when 
the companies would have held one standard deviation 
more credit derivative contracts and compare them to 
the probabilities from the original model. An increase in the 
holdings of credit derivatives with one standard deviation 
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would increase the probability of default of a company 
with 9.5, 18.2, and 8.5 percent for the bond spread, CDS 
spread, and Merton model, respectively. These numbers 
can be considered economically meaningful. S&P reduces 
the probability of default by 2.5%. 
So far we have introduced the credit derivative variable 
as a linear variable in our model. However, it could be 
possible that the relationship between the outstanding 
amount of credit derivatives and the probability of default 
is non-linear. The probability of default could increase more 
than proportional due to the leverage embedded in the 
credit derivatives. 
The squared value becomes negative and significant 
for all three measures. For CDS and Merton, the AIC value 
decreases, indicating a better fit. This progressive effect of 
CDS on the probability of default could indicate the initial 
stabilizing effect, and the subsequent destabilizing effect. 
In addition, a possible explanation is the counter party risk. 
For S&P the coefficient remains positive, and insignificant; 
the fit of the model also deteriorates.
4. Conclusion
Our results indicate that an increase in the use of credit 
derivatives increases the probability of default. Therefore, 
we conclude that an increase in the credit derivatives 
held by financial institutions reduces the stability of the 
financial sector. This is even more pressing considering the 
fact that credit risk instruments are typically only used by 
large, systemic financial institutions. The magnitude of the 
impact of credit derivatives on the probability of default 
of the financial institutions is economically relevant. Results 
further suggest that the relation between credit derivatives 
held by financial institutions and the probability of default is 
not linear, but quadratic. 
Table 5: Substituting the credit derivative variable with its squared value
Coefficient Std. Error Prob. AIC + / -
Bond spread -0.0178 0.0106 0.0974 0.0756 (+)
CDS spread -0.0363 0.0138 0.0112 -0.0364 (-)
Merton DD -0.0752 0.0424 0.0797 3.1150 (-)
Credit rating (S&P) 0.0036 0.0051 0.4884 -2.4881 (+)
Notes: Table displays the effect of introducing a progressive measure for CDS usage.
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